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JOSEPH P. KALT*

The Costs and Benefits of Federal
Regulation
of Coal Strip Miningt
INTRODUCTION
The remarkable developments in world energy markets in the 1970s
revitalized interest in coal as an energy source. There is now widespread
agreement that coal can provide a sizeable portion of future increases in
the domestic supply of energy. The greatest potential for additional coal
production lies in the nation's huge reserves of so-called surface coal.
The development of these coal reserves, however, could be significantly
impeded by federal regulations recently instituted to control the environmental effects of the method-strip mining-by which surface coal is
extracted.
This study amounts to a quantitative cost-benefit analysis of the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA). Incidence and
welfare effects of SMCRA are developed within the context of a multisector model of the U.S. coal industry. It appears that, on net, the national
economic costs of SMCRA outweigh the benefits, albeit by a fairly narrow
margin. Indeed, the net effect is probably too close to call. This, itself,
is a valuable finding in view of the strong claims made in the policy
debate by interested parties.
In contrast to its national effects, SMCRA appears to produce substantial improvements in resource allocation in certain regions of the
country. Still, SMCRA is far from a first best policy. An optimally designed law would yield significant net benefits, while at the same time
providing slightly higher levels of benefits for the consumers of environmental amenities. Notwithstanding the interest of these findings to economists, the "real story" of SMCRA probably lies in the wealth transfers
it produces. These are found to be large and, most likely, regressive.
THE INCIDENCE AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF
SURFACE MINING REGULATION
Background on the U.S. Coal Industry
Although only 32 percent of demonstrated U.S. coal reserves (in tons)
are strippable, the recent trend in coal production has been toward more
*The author is Associate Professor of Economics at Harvard University.
tThe financial support of the U.S. Department of Energy is gratefully acknowledged. The research
assistance of Mark A. Zupan, Margaret Walls, and Peter Martin, and the helpful comments of Alan
Randall also have been greatly appreciated.
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surface mining relative to underground mining. By 1978, 64 percent of
domestic coal production was derived from surface mining, up from 19
percent immediately following World War II and 38 percent in 1969. The
relative expansion of surface mining has occurred in all regions of the
country, but has been most pronounced in the West. Roughly 90 percent
of all western coal is strip-mined and approximately 65 percent of demonstrated domestic coal reserves lie in the West. While the West possesses
large reserves of both surface and underground coal, relative costs of
extraction make surface production considerably more attractive than
underground production in the West.'
The geographical unevenness of surface coal resources may carry political consequences in a federal system. The potential for massive surface
coal development, particularly in the West, threatens the preeminent economic and political position that underground (primarily Appalachian)
mining interests have historically occupied. Moreover, the prospect of
substantial expansions of surface coal production in the West threatens
significant alterations in the physical and cultural environment of an area
that is widely regarded as an important part of America's natural and
historical heritage.
The strip mining of coal requires an unusually large amount of inputs
from the environment. The most obvious impact of surface mining is the
complete removal of the stripped land from non-mining uses. The unsightliness of stripped land degrades surrounding property values, as well
as scenic and recreational qualities. Strip mining can also cause extensive
damage to hydrologic systems through sedimentation and silting of rivers
and streams and/or through the drainage of acidic waste from mine operations. In addition to the adverse effects on water quality, sedimentation
can reduce the carrying capacity of waterways and increase the frequency
of flooding. This is particularly applicable to surface mining in the Appalachian region. The relatively steep slopes of this region create a further
problem of landslides in which the soil and rock (or "overburden")
removed to get at the coal seam result in damage to land, buildings, and
roads adjacent to mine areas.'
In addition to these obvious environmental effects, strip mining imposes
psychic costs on those individuals who value the mere existence of an
undisturbed environment. These are individuals who, although they do
1. For a good description of U.S. coal resources and regions, see BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT:
PROPOSED FEDERAL COAL LEASING PROGRAM (1975) [hereinafter BLM].
2. For a description of the environmental impacts of strip mining, see BLM, supra note 1. See
also, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS INC., OFFICE OF MINERAL POLICY
AND RESEARCH ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T. OF INTERIOR, BENEFIT/COST ANALYSES OF
LAWS AND REGULATIONS AFFECTING COAL: CASE STUDIES ON RECLAMATION, AIR
POLLUTION, & HEALTH AND SAFETY LAWS & REGULATIONS (1977) [hereinafter DOI].
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not anticipate observing affected areas, suffer from the mere knowledge
that a portion of the American wilderness is altered from its relatively
pristine state. 3 Analogously, failure to develop surface reserves can impose
psychic costs on individuals who have tastes for the existence of a developed, industrial environment.
To the extent that the costs (or benefits) of the physical and psychic
environmental consequences of coal strip mining are not internalized by
surface mine owners, allocative inefficiencies will result if there are market or non-market methods of internalization that have costs of administration (i.e., transaction costs, in the generic sense) that are less than
the otherwise external costs. Many of the environmental costs of strip
mining noted here are not internalized by mine owners in an unregulated
market. Organization costs and free rider problems appear to be sufficient,
for example, to prevent the typically large number of neighbors suffering
property devaluation and aesthetic losses from effectively organizing to
make Coasian payments to would-be mine operators. The infeasibility of
such transactions is, of course, even more pronounced in the case of
distant individuals who attach existence value to unstripped land areas.
In the case of water pollution, the absence of a market in water and the
prevalence of governmental allocation of water supplies often leave polluting mine operators free of the costs they impose on downstream water
consumers. Similarly, many recreational amenities, game animals, and
fish on both public and private lands are communally owned and are not
permitted to be marketed, thus precluding or inhibiting the use of Coasian
transactions by hunters, fishers, campers, and hikers. 4
In short, externalities are likely to be present to a significant degree
when a land area is strip-mined: As a result, relative to the optimum
selected by the hypothetical benevolent economist-dictator, surface coal
could be expected to be overproduced and produced with too many environmental inputs in the absence of a corrective policy. Conceivably,
SMCRA could be such a policy.
The Provisions of SMCRA
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act was signed into law
on August 3, 1977. SMCRA empowered the Department of the Interior
3. So-called "existence values" of undisturbed environment and related issues are examined by
J. KRUTILLA & A. FISHER, THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS: STUDIES
IN THE VALUATION OF COMMODITY AND AMENITY RESOURCES 124 (1975). W. SCHULZE,
D. BROOKSHIRE, E. WALTHER & K. KELLEY provide pathbreaking empirical measurements
in the U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THE BENEFITS OF PRESERVING VISIBILITY
IN THE NATIONAL PARKLANDS OF THE SOUTHWEST (1981) [hereinafter SCHULZE].
4. Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Propety Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967), provides a
classic statement of the operation and feasibility of such transactions.
5. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. III 1979).
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to promulgate and enforce nationwide mining and reclamation regulations. The central thrust of the Act is to require the complete restoration
of strip-mined land to its pre-mining state upon the cessation of mine
operation. Surface coal mines, as well as the surface operations of underground coal mines, must return utilized land to approximate original
contour and productivity. Reclaimed land must be revegetated and stablized so as to prevent soil erosion and damage to hydrologic systems.
During mining, mine operations and overburden disposal must be managed in order to prevent acid drainage, waterway sedimentation, and
damage to neighboring property. To provide for the reclamation of already-stripped land, an Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund is supported
by a $.35 per ton tax on surface bituminous coal production, a $. 15 per
ton tax on underground bituminous coal production, and a $. 10 per ton
tax on lignite coal production.'
In addition to direct regulation of the environmental impacts of strip
mining, SMCRA addresses itself to the problems of property rights assignments in water, land, recreational, and aesthetic amenities. The Act
prohibits surface mining in the national park, trails, wildlife refuge, and
wilderness systems. Surface mining is technically permitted (but effectively prohibited) in national forests if there are no significant recreational,
timber, economic, or other values that would be adversely affected. Prime
farmlands cannot be strip-mined unless the land can be returned to equivalent or higher agricultural yields. Alluvial valleys in the West cannot be
mined if mining disrupts or precludes farming. Importantly, where surface
rights and subsurface mineral rights are held by different parties, subsurface right holders (lessees) must obtain written consent from surface
right holders before commencing strip mining if subsurface rights were
originally federally owned. Where both surface and subsurface rights are
privately owned, disputes are to be settled by each state.
Modeling SMCRA
As might be inferred from the foregoing description of the provisions
of SMCRA, federal regulation of strip mining has potential for creating
significant costs for the surface coal mining industry and the domestic
economy. At the same time, the vociferousness with which certain parties,
notably the environmental groups, have promoted the case for SMCRA
suggests that federal regulation of strip mining has potential for creating
substantial benefits. In order to answer the question of whether the benefits
exceed the costs, as well as to measure the impact on winners and losers,
we construct a six-sector model of the domestic coal market. This model
is used to simulate equilibria with and without SMCRA. Conventional
6. Id. at § 1232.
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measures of changes in producer and consumer surplus provide the necessary ingredients for the cost-benefit tests.
SMCRA can be conceived of as a tax on the use of environmental
inputs in strip mining. This tax can be expected to induce both a reduction
in the intensity with which these inputs are employed relative to other
factors of production, as well as an overall contraction of surface mining.
The former effect redounds to the benefit of non-mining users of environmental resources. The latter effect tends to raise the price of all coal,
both surface and underground. This benefits underground coal producers
and harms coal consumers.
This somewhat simplified view of SMCRA can be given more content
with an analytic model of the coal market. In proceeding in this direction,
we take before-and-after snapshots of the marketplace, with each snapshot
covering a one-year period. This procedure does not allow the ideal
measurement of the present values of SMCRA costs and benefits over
the life of the domestic surface mining industry. It does, however, provide
a representative picture of the flow of costs and benefits at any point in
time.
The model of the coal market that is employed here is a partial equilibrium model in the sense that changes in coal prices are assumed to
have no effect on the markets for the close complements and substitutes
for coal. Of most relevance, changes in coal prices are assumed to have
no significant effect on world oil prices. With coal primarily demanded
as feedstock for electric power generation and the firing of industrial
boilers, the alternative fuel of most significance to buyers is residual fuel
oil. Taking the price of this fuel as fixed is tantamount to assuming that
world oil prices are invariant with respect to changes in domestic coal
markets. Most available research on the determinants of world oil prices
suggests that this assumption probably does not do significant violence
to reality over the range of changes attendant to SMCRA. 7
The supply side of the U.S. coal market can be appropriately divided
into four competitive segments: underground producers (u), Appalachian
surface producers (a), midwestern surface producers (m), and western
surface producers (w). The three-way division of surface coal producers
reflects corresponding discrete geographic differences in the costs of meeting SMCRA (see below). In each production sector, pre-SMCRA supplies
are taken to be of the form:
qj = giPiEi ;

(1)

where Ei is the elasticity of supply, gi is a scalar, and i = u,a,m,w. The
constant elasticity functional form of (1) does not appear to be terribly
7. Analysis of this issue is relatively sparse. For a summary see J. KALT, THE ECONOMICS
AND POLITICS OF OIL PRICE REGULATION 33 (1981).
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at odds with the supply schedules which provide the available empirical
estimates of .i used in this study.
The marginal tax, Ti, associated with SMCRA, varies across producing
sectors and raises each sector's (inverse) supply function by T>0.8 Producers, of course, see an after-tax price (Pi) that is less than the market
price. Accordingly, supply under SMCRA can be written as
i
qi = giPiE = g, (P,-Ti)Ei ;

(1')

T = 0. The formulation in (1') implicitly makes the tax of
aqj
SMCRA the same over all levels of coal production, i.e., the marginal
tax is equal to the average tax. While this is probably inaccurate, available
estimates of the cost of SMCRA do not allow a more refined approach.
The possible inaccuracies introduced are discussed below.
The demand side of the U.S. coal market is divided into two sectors:
the domestic market (d) and the export market (x). Again, for methodological reasons, underlying demands are taken to have constant elasticities. Holding income and other non-coal prices constant, the domestic
market's demand at any point in time is given by:

where

qd

(2)

= hdPdrTd ;

where qd is the price of elasticity of demand and hd is a scalar. Foreign
demand for U.S. coal is taken to have a similar functional form. The
elasticity of export demand (-q,) is derived from the residual demand of
the foreign rest-of-world sector (f) after it has consumed its indigenous
supply. This elasticity is given by
f qf -

qf.

f

q

qx

;

(3)

where q, is the elasticity of foreign coal demand, qf is total foreign
demand, and f is the elasticity of rest-of-world coal supply.
Equilibria with and without SMCRA are found by requiring that equilibrium prices leave no excess supplies or demands. The simple approach
to this would merely involve solving for the price that equates the sum
of the four sectors' versions of (1) (or (1')) to the sum of (2) and (3).
This, however, overlooks important details. All of the supplies and demands in (1) (or (1')), (2), and (3) have prices and quantities that are
subscripted for a separate market. This reflects differences in geographic
location and coal quality. To capture these differences, all quantity and
value measures are first expressed on a Btu (British Thermal Unit) basis,
8. Note that even for i = u, T > 0 because of the $. 15 per ton Abandoned Mine Reclamation
Fund Tax on underground producers.
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since Btus of coal are much more homogeneous than tons of coal. The
market for coal is then "located" for modeling purposes on the eastern
seaboard (where all regions sell some supply) and the mine-mouth prices
relevant for production decisions are calculated as delivered prices less
transportation costs. 9 Small relative differences in delivered prices due
to, for example, sulfur content are assumed constant over the range of
coal prices relevant here.
The Costs of SMCRA
Federal regulations requiring revegetation, restoration of original contours, prevention of hydrologic disruption, and avoidance of damage to
neighboring land raise the costs of surface coal mining. Estimates of these
increases in costs are available from a number of sources. Reported
estimates, however, vary considerably from source to source. The federal
Office of Surface Mining and Reclamation Enforcement, for example,
estimates that SMCRA would increase Appalachian strip mining costs by
only $2.54 per ton. A committee of the National Coal Association and
American Mining Congress has argued that the OSM estimates understate
costs by between $7.65 and $20.15 per ton. 0 The American Consulting
Engineers' Council projects that SMCRA would raise mining costs by
$3.50-$6.00 in relatively flat terrain and by $9.50-$14.00 in steep terrain."' In support of 1979 legislation that would have weakened SMCRA,
the Department of Energy (interested, at the time, in increasing domestic
energy production) estimated that the costs of SMCRA's original contour
provision alone would raise surface coal production costs by $3.50 per
ton. 2 Finally, in a report on the 1976 House version of SMCRA prepared
for the Council on Environmental Quality and the Environmental Protection Agency, ICF, Inc. estimates that national average surface mining
costs would be raised by only $1.10 per ton. "
On the theory that investors in the private market place will pay more
for information designed to aid business decisions than for information
produced as input to the political process, we take a 1978 investors'
advisory guide prepared by Mann and Heller as our base-case source for
9. Data on the Btu content of coals is from THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON COAL,
COAL DATA BOOK 73 (1979). Transportation cost data are from 1, 2 ENERGY MODELLING
FORUM, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, COAL IN TRANSITION: 1980-2000 D 6 (1978).
10. 84 COAL AGE 11 (1979).
t1. Id.
12. Id.
13. This average is calculated from data reported in REPORT BY ICF, INC., ON THE ENERGY
AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION
ACT OF 1976: HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PUBLIC LANDS AND RECOURCES OF THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (May 11, 1977) [hereinafter ICF].
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estimates of the cost of SMCRA.' 4 Mann and Heller examine the additional per ton production costs created by each of SMCRA's major provisions for a broad sample of representative mines in each producing
region. Their data and methods permit the costs of SMCRA to be isolated
from the surface mining reclamation costs created by state regulations in
effect prior to SMCRA. Where Mann and Heller's information is incomplete, it is supplemented by technical U.S. Bureau of Mines (1975, 1977)
reports15 which employ similar research methods and obtain comparable
cost estimates. The estimates used in this study are consistent in absolute
and relative magnitudes with those reported in available academic studies. 16
The top panel of Table 1 shows estimates of the marginal state- and
SMCRA-mandated costs of surface mine reclamation. The regional estimates are weighted averages of Mann and Heller's state estimates. The
within-region variation in reclamation costs is typically fairly small when
compared to the across-region variation. In fact, one of the most significant aspects of the estimates reported in Table 1 is the sharp rise in
reclamation costs that occurs as surface mining moves from west to east.
This is due in large part to the law of gravity: the greater frequency of
steep slopes in the eastern United States significantly increases the costs
of moving, piling, and reshaping the land. In addition, western surface
coal deposits occur in considerably thicker seams and under substantially
less overburden than in other parts of the country. As a result, the amount
of land that must be reclaimed per ton of coal recovered decreases markedly as mining moves westward. These cost-reducing factors are not offset
by the tendency for the more arid climate and more fragile soil of the
western U.S. to raise revegetation costs.
The costs of SMCRA reported in Table 1 serve as the values for Ti in
the supply functions described by (1'). Data are available, of course, on
the coal prices and quantities needed to initialize (1), (2), and (3). Estimates of supply and demand elasticities, however, are more difficult to
14. See, C. MANN & J. HELLER, COAL AND PROFITABILITY: AN INVESTOR'S GUIDE
(1980).
15. Other sources examined for reclamation costs included: EVANS & BITLER, BUREAU OF
MINES, U.S. DEP'T. OF INTERIOR, COAL SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION COSTS:
APPALACHIAN AND MIDWESTERN COAL SUPPLY DISTRICTS (1975) (Circular 8695); PERSSE,
LOCKARD & LINDQUIST, BUREAU OF MINES, U.S. DEP'T. OF INTERIOR, COAL SURFACE
MINING RECLAMATION COSTS IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES (1977) (Circular 8737).
16. Schlottomann & Spore, Economic Impacts of Surface Mine Reclamation, 52 LAND ECON.
265 (1976); Lin, Spore & Nephew, Land Reclamation and Strip-mined Coal Production in Appalachia, 3 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 236 (1976); Randall, Grunewald, Johnson, Ausness &
Pagoulatos, Reclaiming Coal Surface Mines in Central Appalachia: A Case Study of the Benefits and
Costs, 54 LAND ECON. 472 (1978) [hereinafter Randall]; and Goldstein & Smith, Land Reclamation
Requirements and their Estimated Effects on the Coal Industry, 2 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT.
135 (1975).
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TABLE 1.
Marginal Externalities Due to Strip Mining
and Estimated Regulatory Internalization'
(1981 $ per ton)
1. INTERNALIZATION INCENTIVES
Regulatory Taxes
on Environmental Use

Appalachia

Midwest

West

State Regulation
SMCRA

$ .70
5.44

$ .51
2.56

$ .13
.41

Total

$6.14

$3.07

$ .54

Applachia

Midwest

West

Water Damage
Land Damage
Flooding
Reduced Recreation
Reduced Aesthetics (local)
Reduced Aesthetics (non-users)

$ .10
1.42
.10
.53
1.08
1.26

$ .06
.75
.22
.31
2.00

$ .01
.01
.04
.04
.93

Total

$4.49

$3.34

$1.03

11. EXTERNAL COSTS
Externality

1. Source: See text for sources and derivations.

come by. Based on the survey by Bohi, _qd is taken to be equal to - 1.1.17
Griffin's extensive study of OECD energy demands indicates that - 1.125
is a reasonable estimate of ,qf. Elasticities of coal supplies are taken
from the U.S. Energy Information Administration's in-depth analysis of
coal supply schedules in the U.S. Department of Energy's National Coal
Model.' 9 These schedules suggest elasticities of approximately Eu = 1.8,
F_ = 1.7,

em

= 2.3, and

Ew

= 5.8. The relative magnitudes of these

elasticities appear to be consistent with Zimmerman's model.' In the
absence of any other helpful information, the value of E, is assumed to
be 2.4, which is the weighted average of domestic supply elasticities.
With elasticities specified as described here, (1), (2), and (3) are initialized (i.e., solving for the scalar terms yields log-linear intercepts) for
17. D. BOHI, ANALYZING DEMAND BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF ENERGY ELASTICITIES
140-45 (1981).
18. J. GRIFFIN, ENERGY CONSERVATION IN THE OECD: 1980-2000 at 95, 136, 168 (198 1).
19. ENERGY INFORMATION AD., U.S. DEP'T. OF ENERGY, NATIONAL COAL MODEL:
COAL SUPPLY CURVES (1978).
20. M. ZIMMERMAN, THE U.S. COAL INDUSTRY: THE ECONOMICS OF POLICY CHOICE
(1981).
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actual 1977 prices and quantities. The year 1977 is used in order to
capture the domestic coal market as it appeared immediately prior to the
impact of SMCRA. Substituting (1') for (1), valuing Ti as shown in Table
1, and solving for the equilibrium then provides a comparative static look
at what 1977 would have looked like with SMCRA in place.
Valuing the Externalities of UnregulatedStrip Mining
Considering the extent to which coal mining and its environmental
impacts have been examined and written about, explicit estimates of the
values of the environmental externalities generated by surface mining are
surprisingly rare. Still, whether or not the new market equilibrium induced
by SMCRA represents an efficiency-improving move depends on these
values and SMCRA's ability to force their internalization.
The external costs of unregulated strip mining are shown in the bottom
panel of Table 1. These estimates of environmental damage are, needless
to say, tenuous, but they represent best-guess assessments of available
information. The primary source for these figures is Randall and others'
comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of surface mine reclamation in Central Appalachia, which employed willingness-to-pay benefit measures. 2 .
The relatively narrow geographical focus of the study forces the extrapolation of estimates to other regions of the country. Where possible, these
extrapolations have been checked against information from other sources.
The estimates of the externalities of strip mining in Appalachia are
assumed to hold, with adjustments, for the rest of the country. The Appalachian water damage figure is adjusted to reflect regional differences
in water value and coal yield per acre of overburden destroyed.22 It is
acres disturbed, rather than coal extracted, that gives rise to hydrologic
damage.23 The same argument applies in the case of damage to land,
which is also adjusted to reflect interregional differences in land values
(as reported by the U.S. Department of Interior) and coal yield per acre."
Surface mine-related flooding is not a significant phenomenon except in
the relatively steep terrain of Appalachia.25
Surface mine reclamation benefits in the form of restored recreational
amenities have been estimated for Appalachia by Randall and others,26
and Spore and Nephew.27 In the former study, only wildlife-related rec21. Randall, supra note 16, at 476.
22. As reported in ICF, supra note 13.
23. For analysis of the technological aspects of damage and reclamation, see DOI, supra note
2, at IV-200.
24. Id. at IV-73.
25. Id. at IV-207.
26. Randall, supra note 16, at 485.
27. Spore & Nephew, Opportunity Costs of Land Use: The Case of Coal Surface Mining, in
ENERGY: DEMAND, CONSERVATION, AND INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 209 (M. Macrakis
ed. 1974).

October 1983]

FEDERAL REGULATION OF COAL STRIP MINING

reational externalities could be estimated. The latter study is relied upon
here. Spore and Nephew's estimate applied to Appalachia in 1973. The
real demand for outdoor recreation has been estimated to have been
growing at a rate of approximately 10 percent per year over the 1970s.
The estimate reported in Table 1 reflects this growth. Moreover, Spore
and Nephew estimate the present value of benefits of reclamation. This
is less than the external cost of failing to reclaim by an amount equal to
the benefits foregone during the disturbance period of mining and reclamation. Based on mine-life estimates from ICF, Inc. and reclamation
periods estimated by U.S. Department of the Interior, disturbance periods
are estimated to be 10 years in Appalachia, 14 years in the Midwest and
21 years in the West. 2' Table 1 reports external costs in the absence of
reclamation and, assuming a social discount rate of 3 percent, accounts
for during-disturbance foregone environmental benefits. To arrive at estimates for the Midwest and West, the Appalachian estimate has been
adjusted for coal yield per acre disturbed and the relative frequency of
use per recreational acre. 29
The low value of recreational damage per ton of strip-mined coal in
the West is the result (again) of very high coal yields per acre and relatively
low frequencies of recreational use per acre (and, hence, per ton). We
suspect that, if anything, the recreational externality in the West is overstated. With some notable exceptions (e.g., the Kaiparowits Plateau in
Utah), the primary recreational uses of most Western land area underlain
by strippable coal are deer, antelope and game bird hunting and some
downstream lake and reservoir fishing. 3" This reflects the predominance
of prairie and grassland in the .potentially mineable area of the West.
Other important recreational activities (such as camping, picnicking, hiking and stream fishing) are primarily concentrated in mountainous regions
in the West. Strippable areas in the Midwest and, particularly, in Appalachia, on the other hand, typically provide a full range of high quality
recreational amenities."a Strippable acres are closer to average recreational
acres outside the West. Treating western strippable acres with belowaverage recreational yields as average western recreational acres will tend
to overstate the recreational externalities of strip mining..
The local population in the neighborhood of strip-mining activity bears
aesthetic damage in the form of landscape modification, water discoloration, increased motor vehicle congestion and noise, and the disruption
of lifestyle and community ambiance. Randall and others are able to
estimate local aesthetic externalities through the carefully designed bid28. ICF, supra note 13, at B 1-11; DOI, supra note 2, at J 1-7.
29. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T. OF INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND
STATISTICS 1979, at 73 (1979).
30. BLM, supra note 1.
31. Id.
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ding games developed by Bradford, Randall and others, Schulze and
others, and Brookshire and others. 3 2 The clearly public goods attributes
of local aesthetic amenities suggest that individual valuations be summed
across the affected population. Accordingly, Randall and others' estimate
of aesthetic reclamation benefits in Appalachia is adjusted for the Midwest
and West to reflect regional differences in population density (i.e., affected
local population). Adjustment is also made for regional coal yield per
acre and foregone during-disturbance benefits.
The last externality estimates in Table 1 to be discussed are the surface
mine-induced reductions in a mining region's aesthetic appeal to the nonlocal population (i.e., "outsiders"). The estimates arrived at are probably
the most problematic, requiring the most tenuous assumptions and the
greatest leaps of faith. They depend on the application of a relatively
new methodology for assessing the value of environmental amenities and
are derived from the only quantitative study of its kind, by Schulze and
others." This study has applied the bidding game technique noted above
to environmental degradation of the Grand Canyon and surrounding area
in the Four Comers region. The study's extremely careful attention to
methodology is a source of confidence. Schulze and others are able to
separate the value of the region to outside users from the pure existence
value of the region to both users and non-users. They find that the latter
swamps the former and that the element of the environment from which
existence value is derived is pristineness. The existence value of the
roughly 45 million pristine acres of the Southwest region is found to be
approximately $5.5 billion per year.34
Notwithstanding the authors' admonition against extending their findings to other environmental attractions, there is no alternative to the
estimates provided by Schulze and others. The following assumptions
are made to arrive at the external cost estimates noted in Table 1. First,
user values damaged by strip mining are captured in the estimates of
recreational damage. Second, valuable levels of pristineness (of the type
associated with the Southwest) are taken to be available in each coal
producing region. While folklore holds that the West is the last and only
repository of America's undisturbed natural heritage, there are indeed
highly valued pockets of pristineness in other regions. 3 To be sure, there
are fewer such pockets of pristineness outside the West and to reflect this
32. Randall, supra note 16; Bradford, Benefit-CostAnalysis and DemandCurvesforPublic Goods,
23 KYKLOS 775 (1970); Randall, Ives & Eastmen, Bidding Games for Valuation of Aesthetic
Environmental Improvements, I J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 132 (1974); SCHULZE, supra note
3; and Brookshire, Thayer, Schulze & d'Arge, Valuing Public Goods: A Comparison of Survey and
Hedonic Approaches, AM. ECON. REV. (forthcoming).
33. SCHULZE, supra note 3.
34. SCHULZE, supra note 3, at 77-83.
35. Spore, supra note 27.
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we assume that their frequency is taken to be inversely proportional to
regional population density. Further, it is assumed that the Grand Canyon
is "special" and that pockets of pristineness threatened by strip mining
are more like the other area covered by Schulze and others. Third, the
existence value per acre is assumed to apply to the entire undeveloped
portions of western surface coal regions, as defined by the U.S. Bureau
of Land Management.36 Fourth, since each acre of strip mining could be
expected to reduce the existence value of nearby acres (perhaps within
the so-called "integral vista"), the total region threatened by strip mining
is taken to be the undeveloped portions of the surface coal regions.
With values in hand for coal yield per physically disturbed acre and
total threatened acres, it is possible to estimate the number of acres with
damaged existence values per unit of coal mined. This estimate times the
existence value of pristine acres yielded by the second and third assumptions from above produces an estimate of the annuity value of the
external damage of coal strip mining to environmental existence values.
The present value of this annuity is the non-user aesthetic externality
reported in Table 1.
The total external costs per ton of surface coal output are shown in
Table 1. These costs are highest in Appalachia and lowest in the West.
The implication for efficiency-seeking policymakers is that strip mining
should be taxed more heavily as mining moves from west to east. Although
SMCRA requires the same level of environmental protection in all surface
coal regions, the general regional pattern of the implicit taxes that are
created by SMCRA's regulations is consistent with this policy prescription. A comparison of total externalities per ton and regulatory taxes per
ton suggests that SMCRA, indeed, had a job to do. In no region was
pre-SMCRA regulation by the states stringent enough to force optimal
internalization of strip-mining externalities. But SMCRA appears to have
erred relative to the optimum in each region. Whether or not this has
resulted in more or less misallocation of the nation's resources than would
have occurred otherwise can only be answered by an empirical analysis,
which is the object of the next section.
RESULTS: SMCRA GETS MIXED GRADES
ON THE COST-BENEFIT TEST
The estimates developed here for the costs of satisfying SMCRA, the
benefits of internalizing the environmental damage of strip mining, and
the necessary coal supply/demand parameters are appropriately viewed
as (at least approaching) the best available. They are certainly not the
36. BLM, supra note 1.
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best conceivable. With this in mind, we now proceed to put SMCRA to
the cost-benefit test. The results are then examined for their robustness
and compared to a first-best coal strip-mining policy.
Winners and Losers Under SMCRA
Table 2 shows what appear to be the most reasonable values for the
aggregate incidence and welfare effects of SMCRA. Table 3 shows the
associated impacts on coal supply and demand. On purely economic
grounds, SMCRA does not appear to be worth the cost it imposes on the
nation's economy. It generates substantial benefits for non-mining environmental users ($1.1 billion per year), as well as not-insignificant
gains for underground coal producers ($130 million per year). These
pluses, however, are slightly outweighed by the losses of consumers and
surface coal producers. The largest costs are imposed on domestic coal
consumers ($399 million per year) and Appalachian surface producers
($773 million). Small levels of exports leave the foreign coal sector
relatively untouched. Relatively low costs of SMCRA in the Midwest
and, particularly, in the West hold down the effect of the Act on surface
coal producers in these regions. 7 The net economic effect on the nation
as a whole is a loss of roughly $122 million per year. If the welfare of
foreigners is irrelevant in questions of national economic policy, the net
national loss would be put at approximately $111 million per year.38
Although SMCRA's overall performance on the cost-benefit test may
not yield a passing grade, the Act's effects at the regional level are mixed.
If changes in consumer surplus can be apportioned in accord with sectoral
output shares, the application of SMCRA to the midwestern and western
sectors generates environmental benefits that exceed costs. Improved resource allocation in the midwestern surface mining sector yields net benefits of $1.5 million per year. SMCRA yields net benefits from improved
resource allocation in the western surface mining sector worth $47.7
million per year. In the Appalachian surface coal sector, however, an
efficiency loss of roughly $159.7 million per year results from SMCRA's
standards and regulations. Of course, this regional pattern is suggested
by the differences between SMCRA's costs and the externalities shown
in Table 1. SMCRA is excessively stringent in Appalachia, but pays in
the rest of the country.
37. In addition to SMCRA's tax on actual mining, the prohibitions on strip mining in National
Forests and alluvial valleys reduce (the present value of) producer surplus. To build this consideration
into the analysis, "prohibited" acres and annual tons are taken from ICF and valued at the per acre
value of National Park land found in SCHULZE, supra note 3. The benefits of prohibition clearly
exceed the costs, although the resulting magnitudes are relatively insignificant.
38. The U.S. has some minor monopoly power in the world coal market. From a narrowly
nationalistic standpoint, an optimal coal policy would have to take advantage of this power. Such
considerations, however, are beyond the scope of this study.
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TABLE 2.
Incidence and Welfare Effects of SMCRA: 1977
(millions of 1981 dollars)
Gain

Interest Group

Loss
$ 399.1

Domestic Coal Users

11.8

Foreign Coal Users
$ 130.0

Underground Coal Producers
Surface Coal Producers
Appalachia
Midwest
West

773.2
192.4
12.2

Environmental Users'
Appalachia
Midwest
West

720.7
274.9
140.8
$1,388.7

$1,266.4

Total
Efficiency Change
Including Foreigners
Excluding Foreigners
Appalachia
Midwest
West

$122.3
159.7
-

$ 1.5
47.7

$110.5
'This is the geographical source of environmental benefits, rather than the location of the beneficiaries.

TABLE 3.
Coal Supply and Demand Under SMCRA: 1977
(millions of Btus)
SMCRA
Supply
Domestic Coal Users
Foreign Coal Users

SMCRA
Demand

Change Due
to SMCRA

13,763.0

-291.8

66.8

-1,218.4

Underground Coal Producers

6,578.0

-211.3

Surface Coal Producers
Appalachia
Midwest
West

3,337.4
1,910.7
2,003.7

-1,347.2
-433.8
+ 59.5

Total

13,829.8

13,829.8

-3,020.4
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In terms of quantities, SMCRA causes underground coal producers
and, to a small extent, western surface producers to expand their operations. In fact, western producers would have shown a small income gain
from SMCRA were it not for the prohibition on production in areas such
as alluvial valleys. Midwestern and, especially, Appalachian surface producers cut back production. Higher coal prices, of course, reduce overall
consumption. SMCRA raises coal prices to buyers by approximately 2
percent. To some extent, the associated reduction in consumption reflects
substitution away from coal and toward other sources of energy. In particular, any SMCRA-induced increases in the price of coal can be expected
to increase the demand for oil. Based on Griffin's estimates39 and Bohi's
survey,' a cross-elasticity of oil demand with respect to coal prices of
approximately 1.0 seems reasonable; and, hence, SMCRA raises oil demand by roughly 2 percent. In 1977, this amounted to 120 million barrels
of oil per year (or 330 thousand barrels per day out of a daily demand
of 15 million). With the marginal source of oil being from foreign sources,
this represents the impact of SMCRA on the U.S. demand for imported
oil. This is only a special'cost (to be added to the losses shown in Table
2) if there are externalities associated with imported oil (see next section).
The conclusions that SMCRA 1) worsens the allocation of resources
nationally; 2) improves the allocation of resources in the midwestern and
western strip mining industry; 3) does not discourage development of
western surface coal reserves; and 4) increases oil imports all carry significance for on-going national energy policy debates. Of at least equal
relevance, however, is the question of SMCRA's impact on the distribution of income across income classes. On this account, it appears that
SMCRA is fairly strongly regressive.
The loss of consumer surplus as a result of SMCRA is disproportionately concentrated below the median of the income scale. The impact of
higher coal prices is felt most severely in the form of higher electricity
prices. Electricity consumption is strongly income inelastic; the fraction
of income spent on electricity by consumers falls sharply as income rises. 4'
Among coal producers, affected individuals include mine owners (i.e.,
stockholders), land owners receiving royalties, and miners. The distribution of each of these groups across income levels appears to put them
toward the upper end of the income scale, on average. Royalty recipients
are most likely higher income individuals, given the positive relationship
between land ownership and income. Similarly, stockholders in coal companies are somewhat skewed toward upper incomes, if coal stockholders
39. GRIFFIN, supra note 18, at 95.
40. BOHI, supra note 17.
41. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR
STATISTICS 368-72 (1980).
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are like average stockholders in the energy sector.42 Finally, coal miners'
average wages exceed national average wages considerably.43
The remaining affected parties--environmental users-also appear to
be concentrated toward the upper end of the income scale. Virtually all
measures of the consumption of outdoor recreational amenities, for example, are correlated with income." Moreover, Schulze and others45 find
existence values to be income elastic; and Kalt and Zupan46 find the
environmentalism expressed in national politics to be positively related
to income. The caricatures of environmentalists as well-educated and
wealthy, and outdoor recreationalists as Winnebago owners and back-tothe-earth college-aged offspring of well-to-do families are inaccurate, but
not terribly so.
Data are not available that would allow detailed description of the
income class structure of each interest group affected by SMCRA. Nevertheless, if we make the gross division of coal consumers as "lower
income" and coal producers and environmental users as "upper income,"
there is a net transfer from lower to upper income individuals. Within
the upper income level, the losses of surface producers ($847.8 million)
are more than offset by the combined gains of underground producers
and environmental users ($1134.6 million). The gain at upper income
levels is $288.6 million per year, while $399.1 million is lost at the lower
end of the income scale. 47
The regressivity of SMCRA does not constitute an economic criticism.
Such criticism can only emanate from ethical considerations, and might
well be tempered by recognition of the possibility that the political system
has already selected society-wide income redistribution mechanisms designed to offset the kinds of regressive transfers (e.g., SMCRA) that
occur continually in a dynamic economy. It is also worth noting that
SMCRA's regressivity is not a function of its slightly deleterious impact
on resource allocation. Rather, regressivity is likely to be a property of
even a SMCRA redesigned to be economically efficient (see below). This
arises from the fact that, as individuals move down the income scale,
they generally want to fill their consumption baskets with more of the
commodities produced from natural resources and less of the amenities
produced by a clean environment. The regressivity of environmental
policy is a recurring dilemma for environmentalists.
42. TOLTEC ASSOCIATES, SHAREOWNERSHIP OF THE SIX LARGEST U.S. OIL COMPANIES (1974).
43. NATIONAL COAL ASSOCIATION, COAL DATA 1978 11-4 (1980).
44. Data are reported in, e.g., LEISURE TIME SURVEY '79 (1979).
45. SCHULZE, supra note 3, at 77-83.
46. See J. KALT & M. ZUPAN, FURTHER EVIDENCE ON CAPTURE AND IDEOLOGY IN
THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF POLITICS, DISCUSSION PAPER NUMBER 979, HARVARD
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 50 (April 1983).
47. See note 38.
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How Robust Is SMCRA's Failing Grade?
The relatively narrow margin by which the aggregate benefits of SMCRA
are estimated to exceed the aggregate costs suggests that the Act's ability
to pass the cost-benefit test is quite sensitive to certain assumptions and
parameter values. As noted, the greatest uncertainty in the analysis probably centers on the estimates of the environmental externalities of strip
mining. Indeed, if the environmental benefits of SMCRA have been
underestimated by only 10.8 percent (9.7 percent if foreigners are irrelevant), SMCRA's aggregate benefits would exceed the costs. Considering
that Schulze and others believe that their estimates of environmental existence values are subject to errors of plus or minus 50 percent, not to
mention the many assumptions needed to arrive at Table 1, it is not difficult
to imagine that the estimates of environmental benefits used here are in
error by 50 percent.48
Another source of sensitivity in the aggregate results might be found
in the supply/demand parameters. Model simulations under a fairly wide
variety of elasticity estimates, however, repeatedly produce a negative,
albeit narrow, gap between benefits and costs. The same robustness cannot
be ascribed to estimates of the costs of meeting SMCRA's environmental
standards. If these costs are only slightly less in each region than reported
in Table 1, SMCRA would cure more resource misallocation than it
produces and would pass the cost-benefit test. In fact, the only study that
is comparable in scope and detail to the sources employed to arrive at
Table 1 reports costs considerably less than those used here. 49 This might
suggest that biases in Table 2 resulting from cost inaccuracies make
SMCRA appear less beneficial than it is.
Additional inaccuracy in at least the estimates of efficiency changes
may arise from SMCRA's tendency to increase oil imports. The likelihood
that such imports carry significant external costs of their own has been
examined extensively and is generally found to be substantial." Any oil
import externalities that are present magnify the reported aggregate efficiency losses of SMCRA by the amount of the externalities times the
induced increase in oil imports. Distributionally, these external costs
appear to accrue to the general public in the form of reduced national
security, higher world oil prices, or macroeconomic disruption.5 This
broad impact of costs suggests that the distributional gains shown in Table
48. SCHULZE, supra note 3, at 7.
49. ICF, supra note 13, at 11 1-60.
50. D. DEESE & J. NYE, ENERGY AND SECURITY (1981); R. STOBAUGH & D. YERGIN,
ENERGY FUTURE 47-55 (1979); KALT, supra note 7, at 222-32.
51. On national security, see DEESE & NYE, supra note 50. On world oil prices, see STOBAUGH
& YERGIN, supra note 50. On macroeconomic disruption, see Tolley & Wilman, The Foreign
Dependence Question, 85 J. POL. ECON. 323 (1977).
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2 may be overstated, while the distributional losses may be understated.
It is clear that the estimated incidence and, especially, efficiency effects
of federal regulation of strip mining are not very robust. The direction
of any bias, however, is hard to call; and it is possible that sources of
bias are offsetting (e.g. overestimated reclamation costs and oil import
externalities). In lieu of any convincing quantitative improvements, however, Table 2 will have to stand as best-guess estimates of SMCRA's
costs and benefits.
Designing a First-BestPolicy
From an economic standpoint, the efficient alternative if SMCRA fails
the overall cost-benefit test is not the removal of all regulation. The very
concept of an externality suggests resource misallocation in the absence
of some mechanism of internalizing costs. The design of an improved
SMCRA is suggested by the regional pattern of gains and losses. Full
reclamation in the West and Midwest imposes costs on producers and
consumers that are less than the environmental benefits generated. In
Appalachia, however, an undisturbed environment is worth only $4.49
per ton of coal mined, while it costs $6.14 per ton to restore the land
roughly to its undisturbed state.
One approach to a first-best SMCRA would be to: (1) require reclamation through performance standards up to the level of associated benefits in each region; (2) impose a per-ton tax equal to the remaining
foregone during-disturbance environmental benefits; (3) allocate any tax
collections to environmental users; and (4) continue to prohibit mining
in pristine areas of particular natural beauty.
This proposed policy would involve no substantive changes in SMCRA's
reclamation requirements as applied to the Midwest and West. Note, also,
that SMCRA already embodies the principle of imposing a tax in addition
to reclamation standards (i.e., the Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund
Tax). In the proposed policy, no strip-mining damage tax would be imposed on underground producers. The prohibition on mining in particular
areas such as Wilderness Areas and National Forests is based on the
conclusion that their value per acre (derived from Schulze -and others in
the manner described above) exceeds the total coal producer surplus such
acres would generate as strip mines. 2
The most extensive changes required by a first-best policy would involve SMCRA's treatment of Appalachia. In Appalachia, some measures
designed to control sedimentation, land damage and water damage appear
to be worth the costs." Other SMCRA requirements such as original
52. See note 38.
53. MANN, supra note 14.
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contour restoration, original topsoil replacement, and zero hydrologic
damage, however, do not generate benefits sufficient to cover costs. In
other words, given a choice of 1) paying a tax equal to the environmental
value of, for example, undisturbed contours or 2) incurring the costs of
restoring those contours, Appalachian surface mine owners would elect
to pay the tax.
Tables 4 and 5 report the incidence, welfare, and supply/demand effects
of the first-best policy outlined here. This policy would incrementally
(i.e., given state regulation) eliminate a national deadweight loss (Table
4) of approximately $154 million per year ($142 million when foreigners
are included). The proposed first-best policy would also generate improved resource allocation regionally.
The proposed first-best policy raises coal prices by less than 0.02
percent relative to SMCRA, and by approximately 2.0 percent relative
to the state-regulation-only equilibrium. As Table 5 indicates, the firstbest policy has virtually no effect on coal demands relative to SMCRA.
It does, however, encourage more underground and Appalachian surface
coal production while discouraging midwestern and western surface production. The first-best policy has virtually the same impact as SMCRA
on oil imports; and, like SMCRA, it increases oil demand by approximately 2 percent relative to the pre-SMCRA equilibrium. Finally, the
distributional patterns shown in Table 4 exhibit the same regressivity as
produced by SMCRA.
The proposed policy would appear to be politically feasible. Coal
consumers are virtually unaffected relative to SMCRA, while all other
interest groups, except midwestern and western surface producers, are
better off. The allocation of tax collections to environmental users makes
them better off in the aggregate and in each region despite less environmental protection in Appalachia than under SMCRA. 54 This result, coupled with underground producers' gains relative to SMCRA, would
apparently make the first-best policy amenable to Congress: Kalt and
Zupan find that congressional voting on strip-mining policy has been
controlled by the combination of underground interests and policymakers'
environmental concerns.- The implied support of Appalachian surface
producers and the associated regional split in the interests of surface
producers would further suggest political feasibility. Of course, the net
efficiency gain of a first-best policy would make it possible to leave
everyone better off with an appropriate set of side payments. While such
54. As noted above, the estimates of environmental values used here are based on willingnessto-pay criteria as are the proposed damage taxes. These magnitudes are likely to understate the
amount of money needed to compensate environmental users for failure to fully reclaim strip mined
land.
55. KALT, supra note 46.
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TABLE 4.
Incidence and Welfare Effects of a First-Best
Federal Strip Mining Policy: 1977
(millions of 1981 dollars)
Loss

Gain

Interest Group

$ 403.2

Domestic Coal Users

11.8

Foreign Coal Users
$ 189.0

Underground Coal Producers
Surface Coal Producers
Appalachia
Midwest
West

551.2
215.7
64.4

Environmental Users'
Appalachia
Midwest
West

745.8
309.6
144.1
$1,246.3

$1,388.5

Total
Efficiency Change
Including Foreigners
Excluding Foreigners

$142.2
154.0

'This is the geographical source of environmental benefits, rather than the location of the beneficiaries.

TABLE 5.
Coal Supply and Demand Under a First-Best
Federal Strip Mining Policy: 1977
(millions of Btus)
Supply
Domestic Coal Users
Foreign Coal Users

Change Due
to Policy

Change Relative
to SMCRA

13,760.0

-288.8

-3.0

64.8

-1,216.4

-2.0

Demand

Underground Coal Producers

6,672.7

+ 306.0

+ 94.7

Surface Coal Producers
Appalachia
Midwest
West

3,785.5
1,854.8
1,511.8

-899.1
-489.7
-551.4

+ 488.1
-55.9
-491.9

Total

13,824.8

13,824.8
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a compensation scheme is usually only the pipedream of economists, it
suggests that some measures could be taken to soften the opposition of
midwestern and western surface coal producers. On ethical grounds, of
course, it may be quite appropriate to compensate these producers.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The nation's very large reserves of coal put coal regulatory issues at
the heart of energy policy debates. Among these issues, the question of
appropriate regulation of the notable environmental damage that results
from the strip mining of coal has been the most contentious. This is not
surprising. The energy, environmental, and financial stakes are sufficiently
important to motivate competing political interest groups. The federal
response to this competition has been the Surface Mine Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977, which established strict standards for control
of the environmental damage of strip mining.
This study has attempted to assess the aggregate costs and benefits of
SMCRA. This has required a model of the U.S. coal market, as well as
disaggregated estimates of the costs of satisfying SMCRA's standards
and the values of the environmental amenities yielded by coal-bearing
land areas. Development of the latter has proven to be most problematic.
While the selected values of environmental values and other model inputs
are undoubtedly subject to wide ranges of possible error, they do not
appear to be unreasonable.
Both the costs and benefits of strip mining regulation increase as policy
moves from the West through the Midwest to Appalachia. SMCRA is
least cost-effective in Appalachia, where stringent regulatory requirements
produce a high level of environmental benefits at an even higher level of
costs. SMCRA performs better relative to economic criteria of efficient
resource use in the Midwest and West, although it apparently fails the
overall national cost-benefit test and imposes aggregate deadweight losses
on the nation's economy in the range of $100 million per year. It does
this while transferring.significant amounts of income from coal consumers
($400 million per year) and surface coal producers ($980 million per year)
to underground coal producers ($130 million per year) and the consumers
of environmental amenities ($1.1 billion per year).
A first-best federal policy that reduces reclamation efforts in Appalachia
and taxes environmental damage that cannot be cost-effectively avoided
would improve resource allocation in the surface coal industry. The result
would be an annual national efficiency gain of $150 million. If tax revenues were allocated to environmental users, they would fare even better
than under SMCRA. Underground and Appalachian surface coal producers would also be helped, although other surface producers would be
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harmed somewhat unless compensated out of tax collections. Overall,
the distribution of harm and gain from a first-best policy would be regressive, as under SMCRA.
The finding that current federal strip mining policy does not improve
the overall allocation of the nation's resources puts that policy on the
same footing as many other regulatory policies that have been investigated
by economists. Indeed, this finding should not be regarded as the most
important of this study. If anything, the deadweight losses generated by
SMCRA are most notable for their relative insignificance (and perhaps
their lack of robustness). The impact of SMCRA on the distribution of
income, on the other hand, is clear and large. Politically feasible improvement in federal strip mining policy will have to be based on recognition of the political role of the distributional stakes of affected interest
groups.

